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ALEXANDROS TILLAS
University of Dusseldorf
HOW DO IDEAS BECOME GENERAL
IN THEIR SIGNIFICATION?
ABSTRACT: Abstraction is one of the central notions in philos-
ophy and cognitive science. Though its origins are often traced
to Locke, various senses of abstraction have been developed in
fields as diverse as philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, ar-
tificial intelligence, and computer science (e.g. Barsalou 2005).
The notion of abstraction on which I am focusing here is as that
of a process of similarities recognition across instances of a given
kind involving progressive exclusion of instance details. As such,
abstraction plays a major role in concept-formation and learning.
Traditionally, abstraction models have been deemed circular (e.g.
Berkeley 1710/1957), while in recent years abstraction models
have also come under fire for being incoherent (e.g. Hendriks-
Jansen 1996), requiring large conceptual resources in order to
operate, and so forth. Here, I flesh out a psychological process on
the basis of which general ideas are formed out of representations
of particulars. The main characteristics of the suggested view are
that abstract representations are structured entities with general
representational powers, while a major role is given to top-down
effects in perception. I argue that the challenges that both tradi-
tional and modern abstraction accounts faced are avoided in the
light of the present suggestion.
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1. TRADITIONAL ABSTRACTION MODELS
The question of how we perceive the world has long figured promi-
nently in the agenda of philosophers and psychologists alike. In con-
temporary philosophy and psychology it is widely accepted that on per-
ceiving the world representations of our environment are formed in our
minds (e.g. Findlay & Gilchrist 2003; Gazzaniga et al. 1998; Biederman
1987; Hochberg 1999; Goldstone 1994; Smith & Heise 1992).1 Fur-
thermore, it is argued that these perceptual representations are often
used as raw materials in the process of concept formation in one way
or another (e.g. citealtPrinz02,Barsalou99). Concepts, in turn, have an
extension in the world and they are thought to pick out all members
of a given category. Given that we only have perceptual experiences
with particulars though, how is it that we can form mental entities, like
concepts, of greater generality or ideas about general properties?
General ideas are critical for categorization, which in turn is one of
the fundamental aspects of reasoning, decision-making, linguistic infer-
ences and so forth. For Locke in particular the process of abstraction is
of considerable importance to human knowledge, as he thinks that most
words we use are general (1690/1975: III, I. 1. p., 409). It is worth
clarifying that Locke does not imply that it is only general or sortal ideas
that can serve in a classificatory scheme (Uzgalis 2012). Furthermore,
abstraction is often seen as a gateway to structured ideas, which in turn
are often seen as a hallmark of human cognition that any theory must
explain (e.g. Fodor & Pylyshyn 1988).
Furthermore, having an account of how general ideas are formed
plays a key role in accounting for learning and concept acquisition. For
concepts are precisely mental particulars with general representational
powers — they pick out all members of a given category. Admittedly,
an account of general ideas is not the only option for accounting for the
origins of our conceptual repertoire. However, the alternative options
are not without problems. The first option is to argue that there are
no representations that exhibit this kind of generality. Instead, ideas of
particular instances play that role when used in the appropriate kind
of way (functional role). For instance, an idea of a particular triangle
could be used as a stand-in for all triangles. The second option is to
argue that concepts do not actually derive from perceptual experiences
with particular instances. Rather they are part of our genetic endow-
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ment. In this way, the need to account for the move from particular
ideas to general ones is avoided. Unlike perceptually oriented accounts
though, this option raises significant evolutionary concerns.
Admittedly, arguing that a better-equipped mind, full of concepts, is
evolutionary less fit than one without any innate concept seems coun-
terintuitive. For, surely, a mind with a large inbuilt conceptual reper-
toire makes us better prepared for any challenges that our environment
might have in store for us. The problem with conceptually pre-packed
minds though is that it is not clear how to decide which concepts are
and which are not innate. Famously, Fodor (e.g. 1981) argues that all
lexical concepts are innate (concepts that can be couched with a single
word, e.g. TABLE), which leads to the controversial claim that BROCCOLI
and CARBURETOR are also innate. The evolutionary benefits of such a
view are far from clear. A more economical account is more appealing
from an evolutionary point of view. Unsurprisingly, no contemporary
Nativists in the literature argue for innateness of concepts any more
(choosing instead to argue for innateness of knowledge biases, propen-
sities and so). For the above reasons accounting for general ideas is a
crucial task worth pursuing.
As already mentioned, there are two dominant approaches with re-
gards to ideas about general properties. On the one hand, there are
those focusing on abstraction (e.g. Locke), while on the other there
are those stressing the functional role of a particular idea (e.g. Berke-
ley, Hume). In its contemporary form, the debate consists in discussing
how we abstract away from the idiosyncrasies of representations of par-
ticulars, thus developing a view from the British Empiricists. Primarily,
the view originates in Locke who argues that we are in a position to
move beyond the details of particular instances on the basis of a pro-
cess he calls ‘abstraction’. More precisely, Locke distinguishes between
two abstraction processes (1690/1975: II 11 9; III 3. 6-9). On the one
hand he talks about abstraction through sensation and on the other
about abstraction through reflection.2
Even though sensations are considered to be the sources of simple
ideas, abstract ideas can also be generated on the basis of sensations.
For instance, while looking at a piece of chalk, one can attend to a spe-
cific aspect of a perceptual experience, say the whiteness of the chalk,
while ignoring its particularities, i.e. its position on a table, its length
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etc. However, even if one can abstract through sensation, the output of
this process lacks the kind of generality with which abstraction through
reflection provides us. Abstraction through sensation is better under-
stood as auxiliary to abstraction through reflection (III 3. 6–9).
During abstraction through reflection, a subject notices a common
feature amongst several distinct stored perceptual representations. As
the abstraction process unfolds, particularities of time, place and con-
textual features of experiences with tokens of a given type are pro-
gressively ignored. By leaving out this particular information, the ab-
stracted idea can be applied to subsequent instances of a given kind.
Crucially, a subject needs to have experiences of white objects, e.g. a
piece of chalk or snow, in order to abstract ‘white’ or ‘whiteness’. In this
sense, selectively attending to a certain feature precedes the process of
abstraction.
Even though Locke’s suggestions are extremely useful, as Berkeley
— one of Locke’s traditional critics — points out, Locke (IV 7. 9) as-
cribes contradictory properties to general ideas. As I will discuss, Berke-
ley bases this attack on Locke on the claim that ideas are picture-like
mental images of perceptual experiences, and is thus targeting abstrac-
tion as a representational quality.
Despite the problems that abstraction models (AMs) traditionally
faced, in recent years AMs have also come under fire for a number of
reasons. They have been charged with being incoherent (e.g. Hendriks-
Jansen 1996), and it has been argued that specifying the content of an
abstraction is an extremely challenging task, that it is extremely hard
to choose the correct AM, and that AMs face great difficulties in han-
dling deviations and accounting for potentially crucial features of kinds
that are nevertheless not regularly occurring in instances (see Barsalou
2005 for a detailed discussion). Such arguments against AMs have led
to more or less of a consensus that AMs cannot work and that we proba-
bly need different methodological tools than the ones abstraction is able
to provide us with. So, the traditional concerns about AMs are still up-
to-date. It is for these reasons that I want to tackle these issues head on
with a position that I think can deal with these objections. I start with
problems that AMs have traditionally faced and tackle their contempo-
rary counterparts later on. Also, given space limitations, I provide only
a small selection of independent empirical evidence in support of the
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main claims of the suggested view.
It is worth clarifying that the suggested view about how general
ideas are formed builds upon the work of Prinz (2002) and Barsalou
(1999, 2003). Despite significant similarities though, the suggested
view is novel in that, unlike Prinz, it does not appeal to the functional
roles of ideas of particulars. Instead, I am suggesting a genuinely Lock-
ean view of abstraction. Furthermore, despite relying on Barsalou’s
claims about the modus operandi of our perceptual systems, I disagree
that there is not a permanent or complete abstraction of a category
stored in long-term memory. Barsalou construes abstraction as a skill
enabling the construction of temporary online interpretations of mem-
bers of a given category. That said, in Barsalou’s view experience does
contribute to diminishing the need for online abstractions to occur ev-
ery single time we encounter instances of a given category (habitual
approaches to interpretation). Departing from Barsalou, I construe ab-
straction as a developmental process that, once complete, produces an
abstracted representation that becomes stored in memory. Further-
more, the suggested view differs significantly from both Prinz’s and
Barsalou’s views with regards to the ways in which concepts are indi-
viduated, even though this is not my main focus here. Briefly, in Prinz’s
Proxytype theory the relation between proxytypes and concepts is a
type/token relation, and every concept could be tokened by virtue of
a different representation on different occasions. In Barsalou’s view
(especially in his 1987) concepts are identified with temporary rep-
resentations of categories formed in working memory. In contrast to
both, I argue that concepts are always tokened by virtue of a single
abstracted representation plus a representation of a particular, given
contextual constraints (contextual constraints play the same role that
Prinz suggests). From the above, it should be clear that the suggested
view is novel in that it offers an updated yet genuinely Lockean view of
abstraction without appealing to the functional roles of ideas of partic-
ulars.3
1.1. Problems with Traditional AMs
Locke’s suggestions on abstraction face several objections. First, there
is a delicate distinction that does not receive the required attention in
Locke’s analysis. It is not clear whether the process of abstraction refers
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directly to the process of concept formation or whether Locke is making
a semantic point. On the basis of Locke’s analysis, it seems that general
ideas can represent general properties or kinds, and thus one under-
stands that he is making a semantic point, i.e. a point about how ideas
refer to entities, or categories in the case of general ideas, in the world.
However, Locke seems to be making this semantic claim on the basis
of a claim about the way in which concepts are formed. Let me first
elaborate on abstraction as a process of concept-formation. According
to Locke, there is a lining up between simple and complex ideas. In
particular, general ideas are formed on the basis of comparing specific
ideas — (or ideas of individuals) — and focusing on the similarities be-
tween specific ideas while ignoring their particularities. So, it must be
that general ideas do not contain information about the particularities
of simple ideas. Here, Locke moves on from abstraction as a concept
formation process and makes a claim about abstraction as a semantic
quality. For Locke complex ideas are general in their signification, i.e.
they represent a given category. However, it is not clear whether gen-
eral ideas contain information about particulars but manage to refer to
general properties on the basis of Locke’s semantics, or whether they
do not in fact represent any information from simple ideas.
Second, Locke’s account is susceptible to a circularity worry. Recall
that, for Locke, different experiences of white objects are compared and
contrasted in order for the subject to abstract ‘white’ or ‘whiteness’. The
main concern here is that in order for different experiences of white
objects to be compared and contrasted, they have to be grouped to-
gether. It is incumbent upon Locke to provide an account of how it is
that pairs of experiences of white objects are selected in order to be
compared. The obvious way of doing that is by having a mechanism
that already possesses a concept that represents their commonality, the
concept WHITE,4 in this case. And the problem is clearly that Locke
refers to the abstraction process in order to account for how general
ideas are formed, while in doing so he presupposes existence of the
general idea in question. It is for this reason that Locke’s view is sus-
ceptible to a circularity worry. If, on the other hand, the selection of
experiences for reflective comparison is not done on the basis of pos-
session of the appropriate concept, e.g. WHITE, then Locke owes us an
explanation of how it is decided which pair or set of experiences will be
Vol. 9: Perception and Concepts
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compared and contrasted with each other, in order for a commonality
to be identified and abstracted.
It is also worth noting, that the process of abstraction through sen-
sation, i.e. when the subject selectively attends to particular aspects of
a perceptual experience, is not susceptible to this circularity worry. For
it might be that contextual information acquired through sensation can
be helpful in indicating which pairs of experiences should be compared.
However, having a non-circular account of how a subject selectively at-
tends to specific properties of an object does not suffice to avoid the
circularity worry that arises during abstraction through reflection. For
even though one can attend to helpful (for the abstraction process) con-
textual features, one can then supposedly delete all of this contextual
information. Furthermore, attending to and storing a bulk of contex-
tual information merely for the purpose of helping determine which
pairs of experiences will be compared, may end up being too taxing on
the cognitive system.
Additionally, aside from this circularity worry, there seems to be a
larger problem for Locke’s suggestions on abstraction, deriving from the
fact that Locke carelessly claims that
“[. . . ]the general idea of a triangle [. . . ] must be neither
oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural (i.e.
isosceles), nor scalenon; but all and none of these at once”
(1690/1975: IV 9. 7).
Clearly, there is an inherent contradiction in Locke’s account. How-
ever, if we were to be more charitable to Locke, and follow his account
of abstraction according to which, what is left out during the abstrac-
tion process is all the respects in which all the particulars differ, surely
Locke should have said that at the end of the abstraction process an
idea of a triangle is in itself neither isosceles nor equilateral nor scalene
but it can represent triangles of all three kinds. At least this formulation
would not appear contradictory. But even in this case, and given that
Locke thinks of ideas as images, Locke’s suggestions are still susceptible
to Berkeley’s (1710/1957) famous claim that any triangle will have to
be one of these three kinds. So, the claim that the abstract idea can be
an image that can represent by resemblance and still represent all three
kinds equally threatens incoherence.
It is on this point that Berkeley famously challenges Locke by claim-
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ing that there are no representations, or acts of tokening representa-
tions, that exhibit this kind of generality. The reason being that there is
no such thing as abstractness in the semantic sense and thus that there
are no ideas that can be general in their signification.5
Berkeley distinguishes between two kinds of abstraction, only one
of which he rejects. The distinction resembles the one drawn above be-
tween issues regarding concept formation on the one hand, and issues
related to a concept’s semantic properties on the other. The first kind
of abstraction, which Berkeley accepts as sound, is one during which
a subject selectively attends to a specific aspect of a perceptual experi-
ence. For instance, when looking at an apple on a table one can abstract
away from the table, floor, and other details of the room in which the
table is situated. In this way, the subject can form an idea of an apple
without any other ideas attached to it. While Berkeley accepts that this
is possible, the formed idea is not actually abstract but rather an idea of
an actual (or possible) particular with certain properties such as a char-
acteristic shape, color, etc. The second kind of abstraction that Berkeley
examines, and rejects, is one related to the ways in which an image is
related to entities in the world. The reason for rejecting abstraction
as a process of arriving at ideas that are general in their signification
is that for Berkeley there are no representations that have this kind of
generality. For instance, it is not possible to have an idea of all possible
dogs. At best, a subject can have an image of a dog, or somehow form a
conjunction of dog-parts. In turn, if all a subject can have is an idea of
a particular dog, then it is not possible to claim that this idea is general
in its signification.
On these grounds, Berkeley criticizes Locke (IV 7 9) for ascribing
contradictory properties to general ideas, (and specifically to the gen-
eral idea of a triangle, to return to the above quotation). It is worth
clarifying that Berkeley bases this attack on Locke on the claim that
ideas are picture-like mental images of perceptual experiences. If it
is accepted that ideas are picture-like mental images, then it is hard
to imagine how one can abstract away from particular details. For in-
stance, an image of a triangle will always be an image of an isosceles,
equilateral or a scalene triangle. Thus, it is hard to imagine how a men-
tal image can represent triangularity as such, and Locke’s suggestions
fall short of accounting for the generality of ideas. In this sense, Berke-
Vol. 9: Perception and Concepts
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ley’s attack is targeting abstraction as a representational quality.
1.2. A Better Solution?
An alternative way to account for how ideas become general in their
signification that does not rely on an abstraction process is by appealing
to the idea’s functional role, i.e. the way it is used by the subject. This
comprises the main gist of both Berkeley’s and Hume’s suggestions.
Having rejected Locke’s suggestions on abstraction, Berkeley
(1710/1957: Intro) argues that an idea can be used as an exemplar
of all members of a given category. For instance, in order to illustrate
a geometrical proof, one can use a particular triangle as an exemplar
of all triangles. The modern analog of Berkeley’s claims is that gen-
eral ideas (type concepts) can be mapped onto more than one thing
(tokens) in terms of their functional role or the way in which they are
deployed in thought processes.
Hume makes suggestion similar to Berkeley’s in his ‘Treatise of Hu-
man Nature’ (1739/1978: I 1 7). In particular, Hume implies that ideas
are not inherently representational, and that they represent things in
the world by virtue of their functional or causal role, through the pro-
duction of mental effects and dispositions. So, it might be that two
identical ideas actually refer to different things by virtue of their differ-
ent functional role in the subject’s mental economy. For instance, the
idea of a red ball might sometimes be used in order to represent the
category of red balls, while at other times the category of balls, and at
other times the category of red things of all kinds. For Hume one does
not need to posit lack of specificity in the intrinsic (imagistic) qualities
of the image in order to explain reference to general categories such as
‘all red things of any kind’. Instead this can be done on the basis of the
idea’s functional and causal role. It is by virtue of the particular func-
tional role that ideas play in the subject’s thinking that qualitatively
identical ideas can represent either particulars or general kinds. The
generality of an idea is not an intrinsic feature; rather, it derives from
the ways in which a subject uses the idea in their thinking.6
In his ‘Enquiry’ (1748/1975: II 19), Hume suggests that concepts
are faint copies of particular sensory experiences, which he calls ‘im-
pressions’. For instance, on encountering a dog a conscious state is
produced in the subject’s sensory systems, which leaves a trace in the
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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subject’s memory. The conscious state produced during the original ex-
perience with a dog, the impression, is more ‘vivacious’ than the trace
left in the subject’s memory, the latter is used as a stand-in for either
the particular object, the perceived dog in the previous example, or the
category of dogs. A second way of acquiring concepts, on Hume’s view,
is by reflection on our mental states. For instance, a subject can form
the concept ANGER by attending to the emotional state they are in when
in anger. The concepts derived from sensation and/or reflection can be
combined to form a new concept. For instance, a subject merging an
image of a mountain and an image of gold can form the concept GOLDEN
MOUNTAIN. So, for Hume, the concept GOLDEN MOUNTAIN is a relatively
complex idea and the concepts GOLDEN and MOUNTAIN are relatively
simple. Complex ideas are fainter copies of the individual impressions
from which they have ultimately derived and to which they correspond
and resemble. It is worth clarifying that resemblance is only at the level
of relatively simple concepts, while complex concepts inherit their se-
mantic properties from their constitutive simpler concepts. Note also
that resemblance is a necessary condition for representation but not a
sufficient one. For, resemblance does not represent but rather carries in-
formation. For instance, the impression of a footprint on the sand does
not represent a foot even though it resembles and carries information
about it.
As explained, neither Berkeley nor Hume explicitly talks about ab-
straction since they both argue that general ideas are ideas of particu-
lars used as stand-ins for a given category.7 Nevertheless, Hume does
refer to a process of composing an idea out of previously experienced
simple ideas, which in turn derive from impressions. This is done by fo-
cusing on specific aspects of impressions, which are then compounded
and transposed in order to form a complex idea. In this sense, there
are certain similarities to Lockean abstraction to the extent that certain
aspects of a given impression are singled out. The difference is that
Locke uses those singled out features in order to account for how gen-
eral ideas are formed, while Hume to account for how a new complex
idea is formed.
Vol. 9: Perception and Concepts
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1.3. Objections Against Berkeley’s and Hume’s Views on General Ideas
Both Berkeley’s and Hume’s views seem to outperform Locke’s in terms
of how general ideas or concepts are formed. However, both of those
views are themselves susceptible to a number of concerns. First, as with
Locke’s view, there is a circularity worry. Namely, both Berkeley and
Hume talk about instances of a given kind, and thus imply that there
exists an independent criterion of sameness or similarity between them,
which is not explicit. As mentioned above, the most plausible way to
do that is by presupposing the existence of the appropriate concept, or
at least the concept of SIMILARITY, which however would render their
views circular in much the same way as Locke’s.
The views in question also face two versions of Devitt and Sterelny’s
(1987) famous ‘Qua-problem’. First consider a given particular, say an
apple A. Apples belong to many different categories, for instance the
category of fruit, the category of edible things, the category of nutritious
foods, etc. On different occasions, a subject can use A as a stand-in for
all fruit or as stand-in for the category of fruit at different instances.
At this point it is not clear what will determine the intended extension.
One way to clarify the determinants of the intended extension is by
acknowledging that the specific extension is part of the general’s idea
content, and it is its content that fixes which general idea it is, i.e. apple
or fruit. Given that the idea of apple is distinct from the idea of fruit,
the problem becomes perhaps more obvious if we consider thoughts
like ‘All apples are fruit’. In this sense, the way in which a given idea
will be deployed needs to be decided prior to using it as a stand-in for
a given category. The extension of a general given idea is not pre-fixed.
In a ‘reverse’ fashion, a representation of a given kind, say a repre-
sentation of water, could be used both as a stand-in for water and H2O.
And even though their extensions are the same, the ideas of water and
of H2O are distinct. Even if the set of instances could be adequately
fixed by inferring from the stand-in for H2O, it would still be unclear
how the class was conceived. The extension of a general idea alone does
not suffice to account for how concepts are individuated. Concepts (or
general ideas) are individuated in a more fine-grained way.
Finally, views that focus on perceptual experiences inputting the
raw materials necessary for abstraction processes to occur seem to have
problems with cases of concepts that do not pick out any tangible enti-
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ties, such as DEMOCRACY, JUSTICE, VIRTUE, etc.
In a nutshell, one could account for general ideas either via an ab-
straction process or by appealing to the functional role of ideas of par-
ticulars. Critics of Locke have deemed his abstraction model circular
and incoherent. On the other hand, Berkeley’s and Hume’s functional
accounts also face a number of rather insurmountable problems (e.g.
the qua problem). Next, I turn to suggest an alternative AM, which
accounts for the formation of general ideas or concepts while avoiding
the problems that all three of the above traditional accounts faced.
2. SUGGESTING AN ALTERNATIVE AM
In the interest of simplicity and in order to focus on problems tra-
ditionally associated with AMs, the present proposal is illustrated in
terms of how simple cases of ideas or concepts, i.e. concepts whose
instances have obvious visible similarities, e.g. TREE, DOG, and so forth
are formed. However, the suggested abstraction process applies to all
concepts that both adults and subjects at early developmental stages
posses. That is, a similar process to the one presented here applies
also to concepts with widely heterogeneous instances, e.g. DANGER,
VEHICLE, as well as lofty concepts that do not pick out tangible enti-
ties, like DEMOCRACY and JUSTICE. Regarding concepts with widely
heterogeneous instances, despite perceptual differences, there are still
overlapping similarities across their instances. For example, in the case
of logical concepts like NEGATION, the overlapping similarity is a mis-
match between the subject’s expectations and the world; for DANGER an
emotional state of fear, etc.8 With regards to lofty concepts like DEMOC-
RACY, the abstraction process takes place in terms of linguistic symbols
(or perceptual representations of words). Note that even though the
stage of acquiring DEMOCRACY builds upon the same abstraction pro-
cess, there is an additional process during which the subject learns how
to constrain the usage of her newly acquired linguistic symbol.9
General ideas are formed by virtue of the following elements being
in place:
1. Representations of particulars.
2. A locus where the raw materials are stored and can be accessed —
e.g. Perry’s (2001) mental folders.
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3. A computational process, which takes as input the bundle of rep-
resentations stored in a given locus and gives as output a new ab-
stracted representation. The abstracted representation is not identi-
cal to any of the input representations and does not merely represent
any of the particular instances.
2.1. Raw Materials & Loci
During an encounter with the first instance of a given kind, a represen-
tation is formed and stored in long-term memory. On encounter with
a subsequent instance – one that gets attended to and identified as a
second instance of a given kind – a further representation is formed. At
this stage, a scanning process is initiated and a match is sought for in
the subject’s memory.10
The scanning mechanism has a parameter; call it parameter ‘X’,
which sets the threshold of similarity between new and stored repre-
sentations, at different levels across different scans. Presumably, the
scanning starts with X having set the similarity threshold at a very de-
manding level. If a match is not found, then X is slightly relaxed and the
similarity threshold is lowered. This process continues for a few times
until a match is found. If a match is not found, the currently formed
representation is classified as new and is stored for further investiga-
tion. Contextual features along with any known information about the
current encounter will determine the location where the representation
in question will be stored. (See also Figure 1).
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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Figure 1: The Matching Process
Once a stored representation matching the currently formed one is
found in the subject’s memory, the stored representation is activated
and drives selective attention in a top-down manner. Crucially, it drives
attention to the same parts of the currently perceived instance that the
subject had attended to during the encounter with the first instance.
Activation of an existing representation, crucially, also allows storage
of the currently formed representation in the same locus in the subject’s
mind (see below).
It is worth clarifying that the cognitive system cannot simply rely
on top-down influences of stored representations for acquisition of in-
put representations for the abstraction process. For, by being influ-
enced by accidents and contingencies of what the first encounter was,
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it would potentially miss out on certain statistical regularities. Thus,
top-down influences have to be more liberal to the extent that some
non-overlapping information is allowed as a by-product of not being
too skewed by the bias of the first encounter.
A similar scanning process occurs every time the subject (encounters
and, crucially,) selectively attends to instances of a given kind, at least
prior to formation of the appropriate general idea (see below). After
a number of encounters, a bundle of representations will be stored in
the mind and crucially at a given locus. Once a concept is formed or
acquired, storage of representations is less extensive even for instances
that the subject selectively attends to. That is, once a given concept is in
place, its instances are simply categorized as instances of that concept
and do not need to be stored.
Note also that stored representations of previous experiences that
do not become reactivated frequently or are not strongly associated
with other representations become fainter — to use Hume’s terminol-
ogy — in the sense that they are harder to access even if they remain
stored. Furthermore, it is neither the case that all representations play
the same role in formation of general ideas, nor that they all have the
same positive memory effects.11
2.2. Abstracting Away
As mentioned above, the abstraction process (AP) uses perceptual rep-
resentations stored in the subject’s mind as input. More specifically,
only representations stored in a given locus are selected and fed into the
abstraction process. Recall from above that representations are stored
in a given locus by virtue of top-down effects from stored matching
representations.
AP is neither endogenously controlled nor stimulus driven. Rather
it is initiated when a threshold of perceptual representations of in-
stances is reached (and a certain number of representations gets stored
in a given folder or locus). In addition to this quantitative threshold
there is also a qualitative one. Thus, existence of a certain number of
representations alone does not suffice for the AP to become initiated.
A suitably diverse range of representations must also be stored in a
given locus. Most probably, these diverse representations carry infor-
mation about different contextual features or non-selectively-attended-
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to features that nevertheless became stored (e.g. information acquired
through peripheral vision). Thus, existence of non-overlapping similar-
ities initiates a process that is sensitive to overlapping similarities.
In addition to the AP being sensitive to overlapping similarities, the
output representation is sensitive to frequency of occurrences in the
input. In more detail, in order for a representation of a feature of a
given object to be present in the output of the AP, the feature in question
needs to be present in a certain proportion of the input representations.
In this sense, AP is sensitive to similarities between members of a given
set of stored perceptual representations.
The view suggested here does not presuppose the existence of a no-
tion of similarity or of an independent criterion of sameness. Rather,
the overlapping similarities within a set of representations are simply
the most commonly occurring features within that set. The AP uses in-
formation carried by representations stored in a given locus in the mind
that are associated with each other with stronger connections. The hy-
pothesis here is that the more frequent a pair of stimuli co-occurs, the
stronger the connections between the representations of these stimuli
will become. This is in line with the Hebbian rule of learning (Hebb
1949), as explained below. Specifically, this hypothesis builds upon the
intuitive claim that members of a given category are similar to each
other. Given similarities amongst members of a given category, there
will be a significant number of stored matching representations that will
drive selective attention to the same perceived features in a top-down
manner (see above). In this way, the representations formed during
experiences with members of a given category will be similar to each
other. In turn, the representations formed during perception of mem-
bers of a given category will become connected with stronger associ-
ations. Crucially, if ‘similarity’ is understood in the above terms, then
a notion of similarity is not required. In turn, the abstraction process
simply selects information that is carried by stronger connections.12
2.3. Properties of AP’s Product
As explained above, the output of the AP is an abstracted representation
built out of representations of particular instances of a given kind. De-
spite the fact that perception occurs in a fragmented fashion — (in that
we perceive an object by selectively attending to and forming represen-
Vol. 9: Perception and Concepts
17 Alexandros Tillas
tations of some of its aspects, features, properties and so forth) — the
output representation is a representation of an object as a whole.13 For
representations of parts that have been selectively attended carry infor-
mation about the object’s overall shape, (Barsalou 1999), part-whole
relations, relations between different parts and so forth. It is because
of the ways that perceptual systems are built that the representation
of relations of parts are reliably represented in the percept and are, in
turn, reliably stored in long-term memory. In fact, information of re-
lations between parts is one of the features that are typically present
in the AP output representation. For instance, while perceiving a chair,
the legs are most often below the seat and so forth.14
The output of AP is general in its signification in two senses. First,
it has general representational powers in that it represents a category
rather than a single particular instance. Second, it represents a category
that includes things that have not yet been amongst the perceived in-
stances. Thus, even though the output is formed out of representations
of particulars, it can represent all instances of a given category as well as
repeated perceptual encounters with a particular entity. For every time
that there is confrontation with a new instance of a given category, a
matching process, similar to the one described above, between the rep-
resentation of the currently and the previously perceived instances, will
occur, and matching stored representations will be activated, since ev-
ery member of a wider category will bear enough similarity with the
AP’s output representation.
Had it not been for the abstract representation, the matching pro-
cess would occur between representations of particulars. Thus an atyp-
ical member (e.g. Penguin) of a given category (e.g. <Bird>) would
not have activated a representation of a typical instance (e.g. Sparrow).
Finally, it is worth clarifying that despite computational similarities
to certain traditional AMs, the suggested AP does not take simple con-
cepts as input. More importantly, the output of the suggested AP does
not have the rich cognitive role properties of mental particulars like
concepts. That is, it is not endogenously controllable or cannot be ac-
tivated in the absence of the appropriate stimulus, and is therefore not
a fully blown concept. (See Tillas (2010) for a further elaboration on
this issue).
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2.4. How Many Instances?
A further point that is worth clarifying is that despite the above claim
that the abstraction process starts when a quantitative and a qualitative
threshold are met there are cases of concepts, which are formed by
virtue of very few, or even a single experience, with their instances. For
instance, it is intuitive to think that subjects will not need to go through
a series of painful experiences in order to acquire PAIN. Therefore, even
though we might acquire TREE via the suggested ‘repetitive’ process, it
does not follow that all kinds of ideas are acquired through the same
process. For instance, there are certain kinds of representations, like
emotions, for which associations can be formed by virtue of very few
repetitions.15
Furthermore, once a super-kind concept is in place, the abstraction
process can be significantly simplified. For on the basis of a matching
representation of an experience with a new sub-kind, e.g. ARMADILLO
and an existing super-kind, e.g. ANIMAL, the new representation will
be stored in the same locus with the super-kind until further informa-
tion about the sub-kind is acquired. Clearly, at this stage, the subject
does not possess the concept of ARMADILLO, but rather a single repre-
sentation or at best a token-concept like THAT-FUNNY-LOOKING-ANIMAL-
I-SAW-THE-OTHER-DAY-BY-MY-FENCE. Neither the token-concept, nor the
single representation has the general representational powers that con-
cepts have and on which my focus is here. In any case, associations
between the representation of an armadillo (or the token-concept) and
the super-kind can be formed by virtue of the overlapping similarities
between the two, e.g. they both have eyes, legs, a heart, etc.
What is key here is that stored representations and concepts con-
tribute to acquiring new concepts. For instance, even though one has
experiences only with dead armadillos on the side of the road, it does
not follow that her ARMADILLO concept will be one that picks out dead
armadillos. This would follow from a partial reading of the suggested
view. My suggestion is that there will be enough overlapping similari-
ties between representations of dead armadillos and ANIMAL (e.g. rep-
resentations of eyes or a non-armadillo dead animal), to form associ-
ations between them. On the basis of these associations, the subject
could recognize armadillos as living animals, despite having only expe-
riences with dead ones.
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2.5. Probabilistic and Diagnostic Information
As explained above, the suggested view relies too heavily upon Heb-
bian associationism. It is worth clarifying that Hebbian associationism
does not merely track correlations between traits. In addition, it distin-
guishes between different kinds of statistical/probabilistic information
that a concept might contain. For instance, conditional probabilities in-
formation (e.g. x will have f (e.g. a heart) given that x falls under c (e.g.
ANIMAL)) and diagnostic information about the conditional probability
that x will fall under c given that x has f. There are two things that need
to be pointed out here. First, according to Hebbian learning, relevant
statistical information about associations between features is actually
stored in the connection weights linking the (nodes representing) traits
together. Differences in connection weights between representations of
different traits carry information about the hierarchy, so to speak, be-
tween traits of a given kind. That is, ‘having a heart’ will feature more
prominently in the ANIMAL folder, in comparison to ‘having legs’. For
clearly, ‘having a heart’ correlates more strongly with instances of ani-
mals than ‘having legs’, and the stronger the correlation, the stronger
the connection between representations of hearts and animals. In this
sense, Hebbian learning does allow for a hierarchical classification of
representations of traits. Both the conditional probability and the di-
agnostic information about the conditional probability are captured in
terms of differences in weights of associations (between representa-
tions that exist in a given locus). The stronger the connection weights
between two representations, the higher up in the hierarchy within a
given set these representations will feature. Thus, information like ‘hav-
ing legs’ will yield smaller conditional probability, and in turn diagnos-
tic information about it, in comparison to ‘having a heart’ to the extent
that non-living things like chairs and tables have legs, while all animals
have hearts (excluding jellyfish and the like).
Second, concepts are not static but dynamic entities. Even though
the suggested view focuses on formation of a mental particular with
general representational powers, it does not rule out that further in-
formation could be added to its representational/informational reper-
toire in the light of further experiences and/or cognitive processes like
reasoning. Crucially, information acquired on the basis of further rea-
soning is mirrored in the concept’s cognitive content or the relations
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of that concept with other concepts, which in turn greatly influences
diagnostic information about conditional probabilities. In this sense, it
would be perhaps too demanding to require from a view about how gen-
eral ideas are formed that it also provide an accounting for all changes
occurring during a concept’s lifespan. On the other hand, a psycho-
logical story about how ideas with general representational powers are
formed that does not allow for updates/additions to idea’s representa-
tional/informational repertoire would be rather shortsighted.
3. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE SUGGESTED VIEW
The view suggested here enjoys significant support from independent
empirical evidence. In this section, I present a selection of evidence in
favor of the main aspects of the suggested view.
3.1. Reactivation of Matching Stored Representation
Demarais & Cohen (1998) focused on whether the nature of the visual
imagery required by a particular task evokes saccadic eye movements,
and whether it determines the spatial pattern of the saccades. In testing
these hypotheses, they asked subjects to solve transitive inference (or
syllogistic) problems with the relational terms ‘left | right’ and ‘above |
below’, e.g. ‘a jar of pickles is below a box of tea bags; the jar of pickles
is above a can of coffee; where is the can of coffee?’. During execution
of the task, horizontal and vertical eye movements were recorded by
electrooculography (EOG).
The results showed that subjects made more horizontal and fewer
vertical saccades while solving problems with the ‘left | right’ terms
than while solving identical problems with ‘above | below’. Similarly,
subjects made more vertical saccades while dealing with problems us-
ing ‘above | below’ relational terms than while getting involved in solv-
ing problems using ‘left | right’ terms. From the above, Demarais and
Cohen conclude that eye movements occur during tasks that evoke spa-
tially extended imagery, and that the eye movements reflect the spatial
orientation of the image. Admittedly, none of the above evidence sug-
gests that the same representation was actually reactivated. However,
the recorded eye-movements are too similar to be interpreted in any
other way.16
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3.2. Top-down Effects in Perception
Evidence in support of top-down effects in perception (that are rather
widely accepted) can be found in phoneme restoration experiments.
For instance, Elman & McClelland (1985) presented subjects with spo-
ken words such as ‘Table’ where the sound made by, e.g. the letter ‘b’,
had been covered with noise. The results show that subjects in their
majority hear ‘Table’ with ‘b’ in place even though this is not the case.
Interpreting this evidence Elman and McClelland argue that a percep-
tual input activates a number of similar (or matching) stored represen-
tations, a scanning process occurs and various competing — similar to
each other — representations influence perception.
3.3. Pattern Recognition Abilities
In this section, I examine evidence for the claim that patterns are per-
ceivable without deploying conceptual resources. Specifically, I show
that perception of edges, motion, color, depth, contrast, position in the
visual field and so forth occurs by virtue of specific dedicated cells in
the early visual system.
3.3.1. Edge Detection
On perception of an object, and due to the object’s structural organi-
zation, different parts of it are differently illuminated. Differences in
light reflected cause different rods and cones in the retina to get ex-
cited at different degrees. Differences in excitation of retinal cells are
encoded and transmitted to the visual cortex via the optic nerve. After
this low-level processing, visual information is sent to extrastriate cor-
tical areas. In these areas distinct regions process information about
color, form and motion (Zeki 1992), cited in Prinz (2002).
3.3.2. Color Perception
Different areas of the visual cortex are involved in processing of color
and motion information. In particular, Cavanaugh et al. (1984) show
that motion perception is lost in color vision.17 In particular, they show
that perceived speed of isoluminant gratings is slower in comparison
www.thebalticyearbook.org
How Do Ideas Become General 22
to that of their luminance counterparts and that they may appear as
stopped for short periods of time.
Lueck et al. (1989) also argue that cells in V4 are specialized in
color processing (reported in Eysenck & Keane 2002). In particular,
they PET scanned (Positron Emission Tomography) subjects while pre-
senting them with colored or grey squares. The results obtained showed
that blood flow within V4 was increased by thirteen per cent on percep-
tion of colored stimuli, while other areas remained unaffected.
3.3.3. Form Perception
Processing of form information involves several areas, including V3, V4
and Inferior Temporal cortex (IT). The cognitive neuroscience litera-
ture regarding form perception is mainly focused on IT. For instance,
Tanaka (1992) tested the hypothesis that cells in IT seem to respond
maximally to simple shapes. In doing so, he presented monkeys with
various objects, while the levels of activation of individual neurons in IT
were recorded. The results show that simple objects produced maximal
responses. Tanaka (1996) focused on the role of curvatures and depth
in object representation and argues that most cells in the IT cortex re-
spond to moderately complex features but not to whole-object images,
except faces.
3.3.4. Motion Perception
Motion information is also processed in the early visual system. More
specifically, it is suggested that area V5 is involved in processing motion
information. For instance, Anderson et al. (1996) used MRI scanning
(Magnetic Resonance Imaging) and MEG (Magneto-encephalography)
to assess brain activity in subjects confronted with motion stimuli. They
found that certain parts of V5, located near the occipito-temporal bor-
der in a minor sulcus (groove) and immediately below the superior tem-
poral sulcus were maximally responsive to motion stimuli, (in Eysenck
& Keane 2002). These findings are in line with Zeki et al.’s (1991) PET
analyses and in studies using functional MRIs conducted by Tootell et al.
(1995).
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3.3.5. Face Recognition
Finally, I consider face recognition as an instance of pattern recognition
abilities in order to show that even fairly complex stimuli, like faces,
could be perceived without deployment of conceptual resources. In
support of this claim, Desimone et al. (1984) investigated the responses
of Inferior Temporal (IT) neurons to both simple (bars, edges, etc.) and
highly complex stimuli such as flowers, snakes, hands and faces. They
found that a population of cells responded selectively to faces. The
responses of these cells depended on the configuration of specific face
features and their response patterns did not alter over changes in the
stimulus’s size or position in the visual field.
3.4. Significance for the Suggested Account
The above evidence lends support to the claim made above that pat-
tern recognition occurs in early vision without requiring deployment
of conceptual resources. Furthermore, this evidence is useful in fur-
ther illustrating the claim that similarity between perceived and stored
representations occurs not by virtue of deploying an independent crite-
rion of sameness but by comparing activation patterns of brain areas,
like the ones mentioned above, that ground perception of the stimuli in
question.
3.5. Hebbian Associationism
Hebb’s rule of learning is ubiquitously accepted and enjoys significant
support from evidence showing that electrical stimulation of circuits
within the hippocampal formation can lead to long-term synaptic changes
(Associative Long Term Potentiation).18
4. PROBLEMS WITH ABSTRACTION MODELS
4.1. Traditional Problems with AMs
As explained in the opening pages, traditional AMs were susceptible
to a circularity worry. More precisely, the main concern with Locke’s
abstraction account is that in order for different experiences of white
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objects to be compared and contrasted – as part of the process of ab-
stracting ‘white’ or ‘whiteness’ — they have to be grouped together.
The obvious way to group these instances of white together is by pos-
sessing a concept or a general idea of white, which every instance of
white will token. As explained, this renders Locke’s view circular. The
view suggested here avoids this circularity worry by appealing to the
role that top-down effects have in storing similar representations in the
same locus. Crucially similarities between stored and occurrent rep-
resentations are detected without deploying perceptual primitives or
independent criteria of sameness and similarity. Rather comparisons
occur amongst activational patterns of brain areas grounding ‘percep-
tion’ of the entities at hand. In turn, abstraction includes only repre-
sentations stored in a given locus, and thus the problem of grouping
different instances of a given kind together is solved prior to the ab-
straction process. The adjacent circularity worry is thus avoided.
Recall also that traditional views focusing on the functional role of
ideas, e.g. Berkeley’s and Hume’s views, faced two versions — one ex-
tensional and one intensional — of the Qua problem. According to this
criticism, the extension of a given general idea is not pre-fixed and the
intension of a general idea does not suffice to account for how con-
cepts are individuated respectively. To return to the same example,
the representation of an apple will be deployed both as stand-in for
the category of apples, (sub-kind) as well as for the category of fruit
(super-kind). The suggested view avoids both the extensional and in-
tensional version of the Qua problem since it does not appeal to the
functional role of an idea of a particular. Regarding the extensional
version, the present view suggests that thinking of the category apple
occurs by virtue of deploying an abstracted structured representation
of an apple. In turn, thinking of the category fruit, an abstracted rep-
resentation of fruit, e.g. a representation carrying information about
nutritious edible things growing in trees.
What is key here is that both sub-kinds and super-kinds have their
own unique (abstracted) representations. That is, an apple is for in-
stance represented as an edible spherical thing. The extension of ‘apple’
is what this representation picks out — all apples. In the case of the cat-
egory fruit (super-kind), the representation of nutritious edible things
growing in trees is deployed. This representation is different from a
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representation of an apple. So, the extension of both apple and fruit
is fixed. Hence, in the case of the thought “apple is a fruit” different
representations will be deployed. In a similar fashion, different rep-
resentations will be deployed in the case of thinking of apples and/or
fruit separately. So, by having the extension of concepts fixed, the (ex-
tensional version) of the ‘qua’ problem is sufficiently dealt with.
With regards to the intensional version, the ideas WATER and H2O
are distinct and are structured from representations carrying informa-
tion about a tasteless, odourless liquid in the first case, and about a
specific chemical constitution in the second. In the suggested view the
idea H2O is acquired on the basis of experiences with chemical formu-
las and the like, rather than instances of water (alone). The intensional
version of the ‘qua’ problem is thus also avoided, by virtue of represen-
tations of ‘water’ and ‘h2o’ being different from each other. In this way,
concepts in the suggested account are individuated in an adequately
fine-grained way.
4.2. Contemporary Problems with AMs
In this section, I am focusing on contemporary concerns facing AMs
in general and the view suggested here in particular. With regards to
the latter, there is a vast array of empirical evidence that could be po-
tentially used against it. For instance, one could appeal to contempo-
rary Knowledge Nativism (e.g., Spelke 1994; Spelke & de Walle 1993)
and argue that the suggested view does not build upon knowledge that
Knowledge Nativists argue we innately possess. To this extent, even if
the suggested view is plausible it is not informed by recent empirical
evidence and should be thus abandoned. Furthermore, evidence from
developmental psychology for subjects deploying information about es-
sential properties of things in the world during categorization tasks
could be used against the suggested view. (Consider for instance Man-
dler and McDonough’s (1996) argument against Keil’s (1989) Original
Sim hypothesis).19
The present view could also be challenged from a neuroscientific
point of view. Specifically, as explained, the present view depends heav-
ily upon Hebbian learning. In turn, Hebbian learning is vindicated by
evidence for Long Term Potentiation. However, there is little evidence
that directly links LTP to the storage of memories and learning (Shors
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& Matzel 1997). Given the central role that LTP plays in the suggested
view, a major component of the suggested abstraction view is not em-
pirically, at least not directly, vindicated. Given space limitations, it is
practically impossible to do justice to all of these arguments here. Fur-
thermore, convincing replies against such views are well documented
in the literature. For instance, (Prinz 2002) has argued convincingly
against Knowledge Nativists and showed that even at very early de-
velopmental stages experience suffices to provide the knowledge that
Nativists take to be innate. Also, Prinz has tackled criticisms of Keil’s
Original Sim and convincingly argued that despite seemingly appealing
to knowledge about essences of things in the world, categorization is
still driven by similarity. Finally, Hawkins (1997) has provided signif-
icant evidence for the connection of LTP to memory storage, which in
turn favors the suggested view, (see also Tillas (2010).
The main reason why I do not focus on the aforementioned empir-
ical work here, however, is because none of these experiments targets
the cognitive bases of the view I have suggested. For instance, none of
this evidence targets the way top-down effects contribute to avoiding
circularity concerns or how appealing to Hebbian associationism could
help in identifying similarities amongst instances. For this reason, and
in the interest of keeping the discussion focused, I am examining criti-
cisms that do target specific aspects of AMs that are similar to the one
I suggest here and in this sense challenge the main cognitive underpin-
nings of the present account.
4.2.1. In Need of a Library of Representations
The first of the contemporary concerns facing the cognitive bases of
AMs that I am considering here regards the existence of a library or lo-
cus where representations that are fed into the abstraction process are
stored. More specifically, according to Hendriks-Jansen (H-J) (1996),
in order for any AM to work, there needs to be a ‘library’ in the mind
where representations of different instances are stored together and
from which the AM can abstract the features that these representations
of different instances have in common. According to H-J, the available
AMs do not and cannot account for the existence of a ‘library’ of this
kind. In my reading of H-J, he is not really concerned with the actual
storage device but he is rather concerned with how these representa-
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tions ended up in a given locus in memory. Also, this criticism could be
seen as running in parallel to the claim that specifying the content of
an abstraction is an extremely challenging task.
Admittedly, existing AMs cannot account for the existence of a li-
brary of this kind. Despite significant similarities with AMs, the sug-
gested view differs in that the task of selecting which representations
go through abstraction is not itself achieved by abstraction. Rather, only
representations stored in a given locus will enter this process. In turn,
top-down effects from representations already stored in the mind deter-
mine which representations will become stored in the locus in question.
Alternatively one could appeal to dynamic representations à la Con-
nectionism, to the extent that the relevant statistical information about
associations between features is stored in the connection weights link-
ing the (nodes representing) traits together. In this case, storage of
representations in loci is not necessary. However, existence of loci al-
lows the system to categorize cases of representations in clusters, and
thus use them in order to acquire certain other concepts of sub-kinds,
recall for instance the ANIMAL – ARMADILLO example from above. Fur-
thermore, existence of loci allows the system to deploy representations
in imagistic thinking more readily, e.g. thinking whether your shop-
ping bags would fit in your car’s trunk by virtue of deploying an image
or representation of the available space in your car’s trunk at a given
time t.
In any case, representing information in a connectionist way alone
does not explicitly yield discrete concepts but is rather only capable of
predicting which other features would become co-instantiated with cer-
tain given features, e.g. representations of a trunk will be co-instantiated
with representations of brunches, in the case of tree. If it is assumed
that discrete concepts could be acquired solely in terms of connectionist-
like representations, then it is not clear how the acquired concepts could
contain information about atypical instances of a given kind, e.g. con-
sider penguin as an atypical member of <Bird>. In contrast, existence
of loci allows representations of atypical instances to be stored in the
same locus. And even though characteristics of atypical members, e.g.
the kind of wings that penguins have, will not feature in the abstracted
bird representation, this information will still be available to the subject
to categorize penguins as birds once she has acquired bird.
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Existence of loci is a psychologically plausible suggestion to the ex-
tent that not all past experiences are stored in the appropriate locus,
but as explained, only those that are selectively attended to and mainly
prior to acquisition of the appropriate concept. Furthermore, existence
of loci and stored representations contribute greatly to concept individ-
uation. Briefly, when tokening a concept, the abstracted representation
becomes activated alongside a representation of a particular given con-
textual constraints. These representations of particulars would not have
been available to the system had it not been for loci.
4.2.2. Singling Traits Out
A further criticism by H-J concerns the ways that objects are singled out
during perceptual experiences. In particular, his concern is that objects
can only be singled out by virtue of prior possession (and deployment)
of concepts.
Unlike in traditional AMs, in the view suggested here low-level sys-
tems like pattern recognition abilities underpin the processes of singling
out a given object from its background. In my opinion, H-J is mistaken
in claiming that in order to isolate a given area of the sensory projection
the subject has to identify the area in question as meaningful. Rather,
the subject can isolate certain areas or properties of the perceived object
by making use of her low-level pattern recognition abilities.
Crucially, the ability to recognize certain similarities across objects
in the world has to be in place prior to the AP. There are at least two
ways to account for this similarity recognition ability, one that does and
one that does not build upon representational primitives. As shown
above, similarity recognition abilities that do not build upon represen-
tational primitives enjoy significant empirical support (e.g. Kellman
1993). Given that these detectors reside at the lower (non-conceptual)
level, they do not pose any circularity threats to the suggested view. Re-
garding abilities that do build upon representational primitives, recog-
nition of similarities across instances (of a given kind) could be ex-
plained by appealing to an innate minimal repertoire of representa-
tions, possibly similar to Biederman’s ‘geons’ (1987; 1990). Crucially,
these representational primitives are also non-conceptual and thus do
not pose any circularity concerns either. Both of these ways show how
salient features could be singled out without being identified as mean-




As explained, AMs have been largely seen as untenable. Thus, it is most
often argued that we probably need more sophisticated methodological
tools than the ones that abstraction could ever provide us with. In this
paper, I questioned this idea and put forth an account about how ideas
manage to represent general properties or kinds. My motivation for
doing this stems from the significance that an account of general ideas
has for categorization — one of the fundamental aspects of learning,
reasoning, decision-making, linguistic inferences and so forth.
My main point is that abstraction occurs by virtue of recognition of
feature overlaps amongst instances of a given kind rather than by de-
ploying a concept of SIMILARITY or an independent criterion of same-
ness. In presenting my views, I relied heavily both upon Prinz’s (2002)
and Barsalou’s (1999) suggestions. Despite similarities to these ac-
counts though, the suggested view is novel in that it provides a Lockean
alternative to Prinz’s emphasis on the functional role of ideas of partic-
ulars. Specifically, I have shown that general properties are accounted
for by virtue of having an abstracted representation. This abstracted
representation becomes stored in memory and is deployed whenever
the appropriate concept is tokened. As explained, this contrasts with
Barsalou’s construal of abstraction as a skill for constructing temporary
online interpretations of members of a given category.
As shown, the abstraction view suggested here enjoys significant
empirical support from independent evidence. Given space limitations,
I have only presented a selection of supporting empirical evidence for
the main aspects of the suggested account. Namely, I have presented
psychological and neuroscientific evidence for the claims that on per-
ception of a subsequent instance of a given kind a matching stored rep-
resentation becomes activated and drives selective attention in a top-
down manner. Furthermore, the presented evidence suggests that pat-
tern recognition occurs at a lower computational level (early vision in
the case of visual perception) and thus that no conceptual resources are
required.
In a nutshell, I have shown that despite it being currently unpop-
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ular, abstraction is still methodologically rigorous. By suggesting an
empiricist account of how abstraction occurs that is novel, avoids chal-
lenges that both traditional and contemporary AMs faced, and is empiri-
cally vindicated, I have hopefully created some vital space for empiricist
views dealing with categorization, learning and reasoning.
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Notes
1See also Haselager et al. (2003) for a detailed overview of the representationalism
debate.
2 ‘Ideas’ in Locke’s terminology can be mapped fairly accurately to what in contempo-
rary literature are referred to as concepts.
3The suggested view exhibits advantages with regards to publicity or shareability of
concepts, due to the same abstracted representation being always activated when to-
kening a given concept, while the additional representation of particulars contributes to
accounting for conceptual change. See also Tillas (2010) and Tillas & Trafford (forth-
coming 2015) for a detailed discussion.
4Henceforth, I will be using small caps for concepts, e.g. WHITE for the concept of
white.
5It seems here that Berkeley is assuming that the nature of representations is such that
representation is resemblance and thus (naturally) interprets ideas as images.
6Despite the similarities between Hume’s and Berkeley’s ways of accounting for repre-
sentative generality, their suggestions differ in terms of the specifications of the relevant
functional relationships. For instance, unlike Berkeley, Hume attributes a major role to
words.
7That said, see at the end of Book I, Section VII of the Treatise (1739/1978) where
Hume does seem to talk about a mental process that he thinks accounts for what others
would call abstraction. I owe this historical correction to Ben Bayer.
8See Barsalou (1999) for a similar suggestion about NEGATION.
9See Prinz (2002) for a similar suggestion.
10Evidence in support of this claim can be found, amongst others, in Spivey & Geng
(2001); Chao et al. (1999); Barsalou (1999); Demarais & Cohen (1998); Farah (1995,
1989); Finke (1989); Kosslyn et al. (1995); Brandt & Stark (1997); Noton & Stark (1971).
Note that the same scanning process is in principle initiated during the encounter with the
first instance. However, this process is short-lived and cognitively ‘uninteresting’ given
that at the time of the first encounter there are no matching representations stored in
the mind. As explained in the text, comparisons at this stage occur between activational
patterns of brain areas grounding perception of instances of the category at hand.
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11Consider for instance the distinction between bottom-up attention, i.e. attention
captured by salient features, and top-down allocation of attention, i.e. attention driven
by one’s intentions, e.g. Looking for a set of keys in a drawer. Top-down attention has
been shown to have stronger positive memory effects in cognitive tasks. This hypothe-
sis builds upon evidence showing that unlike bottom-up attention, top-down attention
enhances formation of representations of attended to features/aspects/information, e.g.
Corbetta et al. (1990); Noudoost et al. (2010); as well as on evidence showing that in-
formation attended to on the basis of top-down attention will later on be relevant for
memory formation, Uncapher et al. (2011) or later remembering, Craik et al. (1996).
12See also Bayer (2009) for an analysis of similarities as comparative differences.
13e.g. Barsalou (1999); Findlay & Gilchrist (2003); Gazzaniga et al. (1998); Biederman
(1987); Hochberg (1999); Goldstone (1994); Smith & Heise (1992).
14This issue is normally associated with the binding problem, on which I do not further
elaborate here, but see Damasio’s (1989) ‘Convergence Zones’ hypothesis for a suggested
solution.
15Following Prinz (2004), I treat emotions as perceptually based and as contributing to
acquisition of concepts like PAIN. Furthermore, emotions could play the role of a sameness
marker in cases of heterogeneously instantiated concepts like DANGER, and so forth.
16See also Spivey & Geng (2001); Brandt & Stark (1997); Noton and Stark’s (1971)
‘Scanpath theory’; Farah (1995, 1989); Finke (1989); Kosslyn et al. (1995); Chao et al.
(1999).
17Similar results can be found in studies by Hawken et al. (1994); Livingstone & Hubel
(1987); Lu et al. (1999); Mullen & Boulton (1992a,b); Troscianko & Fahle (1988).
18For studies of frequency potentiation (LTP), which greatly resembles Hebbian learn-
ing, see Bliss & Gardner-Medwin (1973); Martinez et al. (2002). For objections to the
claim that LTP is a learning mechanism see Shors & Matzel (1997) and Hawkins (1997)
for a reply.
19Briefly in his Original Sim hypothesis Keil argues that at early developmental stages
categorization occurs by virtue of visible similarities and at later stages this is done by
virtue of information about essential properties of things in the world.
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